De SP piekt momenteel in diverse opiniepeilingen. Ook in de jongste peiling van TNS NIPO: als er vandaag verkiezingen zouden zijn, zou de SP met maar liefst 36 zetels de grootste partij worden. Het electorale succes van de SP riep bij sommige politici en media de vraag op of de kiezer niet alleen de persoon Roemer waardeert, maar de standpunten van deze partij eigenlijk wel ondersteunt. Onderzoek van TNS NIPO toont dat vooral veel sociaaleconomische standpunten van de SP op een breed draagvlak onder de Nederlandse bevolking kunnen rekenen. Op sociaalcultureel vlak is de steun minder ondubbelzinnig.

“De SP heeft de wind mee”, sprak PVV-leider Geert Wilders op dinsdag 24 januari voor de camera van RTL Z. “Maar als je naar de inhoud kijkt, houd ik mijn hart vast als ze het ooit in Nederland voor het zeggen krijgen.” Wilders typeerde de SP als ‘een wolf in schaapskleren’.

Vooralsnog houden Nederlanders hun hart nog niet vast, als er concrete stellingen uit het verkiezingsprogramma van de SP aan Nederlanders worden voorgelegd. Dat geldt niet in de laatste plaats voor PVV- en PvdA-kiezers uit juni 2010, die in veel opzichten nauwelijks van SP-kiezers verschillen.

1 | Verschillen tussen kiezers op sociaaleconomische thema’s

Stemgedrag juni 2010

SP

PVV

VVD

CDA

PvdA

Gem.

Helemaal/tamelijk mee eens

%

%

%

%

%

%

Voor bruto jaarinkomens hoger dan 150.000 euro moet

er een toptarief van 65% komen

90

78

55

75

82

73

Het minimumloon moet de komende jaren met 5% worden verhoogd

85

73

58

55

84

70

De belastingen op winsten boven 200.000 euro moet

worden verhoogd van 25,5% naar 30%

77

74

54

70

83

70

 Het eigen risico in de zorg moet worden afgeschaft

76

87

55

66

70

70

De duur van de WW mag niet worden verkort

79

61

46

60

76

64

De AOW-leeftijd moet op 65 jaar blijven

80

85

60

44

50

62

Het ontslagrecht mag niet worden versoepeld

72

71

44

60

73

61

Marktwerking in bus- en treinvervoer moet worden teruggedraaid

66

65

53

61

59

60

De hypotheekrenteaftrek wordt in tien jaar afgebouwd tot een regeling die alleen nog geldt voor huizen tot maximaal 350.000 euro tegen 42% aftrek

66

67

53

64

73

59

De invoering van een toptarief (65% voor jaarinkomens vanaf 150.000 euro per jaar) kan op bijna driekwart (73%) steun van de Nederlanders rekenen. Dat geldt in bovengemiddelde mate voor SP-kiezers (90%) en PVV-kiezers (78%). Het geleidelijk afbouwen en aftoppen van de hypotheekrenteaftrek kan relatief gezien op de minste steun rekenen, maar nog altijd ruim de helft (59%) van de ondervraagden zegt voor te zijn.

 

PVV-kiezers zijn minder sterk dan SP-kiezers gekant tegen het verkorten van de WW-duur (61% versus 79%), maar ze zijn nog feller dan SP-kiezers voorstander van het afschaffen van het eigen risico in de zorg (87% versus 76%) en het handhaven van de AOW-leeftijd op 65 jaar (85% versus 80%). PvdA-kiezers verschillen nauwelijks van mening van SP-kiezers, maar zijn wat de AOW-leeftijd betreft veranderingsgezinder (‘slechts’ 50% wil de AOW-leeftijd handhaven).

 

“Sociaal-culturele” standpunten SP krijgen minder handen op elkaar

Minder ondubbelzinnig is de steun voor de standpunten van de SP op sociaal-cultureel gebied. Het aanpakken van de weigerambtenaar en de gratis toegang tot rijksmusea kan op de steun van een meerderheid van de Nederlanders rekenen (62% en 57%), maar de standpunten over ontwikkelingshulp (Nederlandse hulp bij het opzetten van een klimaatbeleid), over kraken (terugdraaien verbod) en softdrugs (legalisering) halen geen meerderheid, niet eens onder de eigen kiezers.

Kenmerkende PVV-standpunten (minimumstraffen en hogere maximumstraffen, terugdraaien van de openstelling arbeidsmarkt voor Oost-Europeanen, alleen ontwikkelingshulp bij rampen) kunnen daarentegen op ruime steun rekenen, ook onder SP-kiezers.

2 | Verschil tussen kiezers op sociaal-culturele thema’s

Stemgedrag 2010

SP

 

PVV

VVD

CDA

PvdA

Gem.

Helemaal/tamelijk mee eens

%

%

%

%

%

%

SP-standpunten

 

 

 

 

 

 

Ambtenarenmoeten verplicht worden om een huwelijk tussen twee mensen van dezelfde sekse te sluiten, ook als ze daar gewetensbezwaren tegen hebben

82

65

72

49

76

62

Rijksmusea zouden gratis moeten zijn

63

63

56

65

59

57

Nederland moet ontwikkelingslanden helpen bij het opzetten van een goed klimaatbeleid

49

18

38

55

68

46

De verkoop en teelt van softdrugs voor de Nederlandse markt moet legaal worden

38

38

22

35

49

34

Kraken moet weer mogen

30

18

10

14

29

21

PVV-standpunten

Er moeten minimumstraffen en hogere maximumstraffen komen

90

94

84

79

78

80

De leeftijdsgrens voor strafrechtelijke vervolging van meerderjarigen moet van 18 naar 16 jaar

88

83

90

83

75

78

De openstelling van de arbeidsmarkt voor Polen, Roemenen en Bulgaren moet worden teruggedraaid

78

93

71

66

60

68

Nederland moet alleen nog maar bij rampen ontwikkelingshulp bieden

57

86

71

48

51

60

SP ‘virtueel’ de grootste partij van Nederland

Als er vandaag verkiezingen voor de Tweede Kamer zouden worden gehouden, is de kans groot dat de SP de grootste partij zou zijn. De SP maakt in vergelijking met een maand eerder een grote sprong en zou de VVD nu voorblijven (36 om 32 zetels). De winst van de SP gaat ten koste van de PvdA (17 zetels), maar in vergelijking tot de vorige peiling ook ten koste van D66 (13 zetels, verlies van 4) en GroenLinks (7 zetels, verlies van 3). De PVV zakt naar 20 zetels, het CDA naar 13 zetels.

3| SP achterhaalt VVD, middenpartijen CDA en PvdA doen het onveranderd slecht

 

TK 2010

4 okt

’10

25 okt ‘10

22 nov  

’10

4 jan ‘11

28 feb

‘11

26 apr ‘11

13 sept ‘11

19 dec ‘11

10 jan

 ‘12

6 feb

‘12

VVD

31

31

33

38

36

36

31

28

32

28

32

PvdA

30

27

26

22

24

24

21

21

22

16

17

PVV

24

28

31

22

21

22

22

22

22

24

20

CDA

21

14

16

18

16

18

18

19

14

16

13

SP

15

15

14

15

15

16

19

20

24

26

36

D66

10

13

11

15

16

16

16

19

16

17

13

GL

10

11

11

12

14

9

12

9

7

10

7

CU

5

6

5

5

4

6

5

7

7

6

7

PvdD

2

2

1

2

2

1

3

2

1

2

1

SGP

2

3

2

1

2

2

3

2

3

3

3

50 Plus

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

1

2

2

1

De coalitie (samen 65 zetels) komt nog altijd ruimschoots te kort voor een virtuele meerderheid. Hoofdzakelijk dankzij de grote winst van de SP van de afgelopen maanden zou een links blok (SP, PvdA, GroenLinks) aangevuld met D66 nu op 73 zetels kunnen rekenen.

Bij verspreiding of publicatie de bron TNS NIPO gebruiken.

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Prejudice against Greece has taken on grotesque proportions. Seriously, the Greeks work harder than anyone else — stop blaming them!

Written by Ingeborg Beugel for NRC Handelsblad, translation by Jérôme Roos

There’s only one word that adequately describes the majority of Dutch media reports on Greece right now: a witch hunt. Of all the arrogant stupidity, full of gut feelings of Dutch superiority, De Telegraaf takes the cake. ”Boom, kick them out of the eurozone. Our citizens no longer want to pay for these wasteful Greeks,” was this newspaper’s headline on May 19, following the results of a Telegraaf survey of over 11,000 participants. Or what about the following headline, on May 13th: “Again, billions of euros thrown into a bottomless pit.” Apparently this kind of nonsense works. By now, 58 percent of Dutch people are opposed to ‘giving’ even a penny to Greece.

For what it’s worth, the average Greek retirement age is nearly 65. Some Greeks that I know who take up their retirement funds early, usually receive between 200 and 600 per month. At that point, sitting on your ass is not even an option. These people have to immediately find employment elsewhere, usually more than one job. After the first round of cuts last year, a high school teacher now earns an average of 800 euros per month. 500 euros of this goes to rent and other fixed costs. You’re left with 300 euros to live off. As a teacher, you simply can’t start a family. And what do you do if you’re a kindergarten teacher or a hostess with a salary of 650 euros per month? A Greek widow (my 94-year old neighbor on Hydra) lives off 400 euros a month. That’s not even enough for her diapers and medicine. She manages to pull through under appalling conditions thanks to her family and neighbors. I don’t know any Dutch person working three jobs to make ends meet, but I do know dozens of Greeks who work three jobs just to survive. Yes, there are Greeks benefiting from high and early retirement. They are an exception, not the rule. By the way: on Hydra, there’s a retired Dutch teacher, a carefree baby boomer, who retired at her fiftieth, never having to work again and enjoying Greece for the rest of her life without any financial worries. Not a single Greek colleague of hers could do that.

According to the latest Eurostat statistics, the Greeks work 40.6 hours a week, most of all 27 EU member states. That says nothing about productivity and efficiency — which is lower — but it does say something about the alleged laziness of the Greeks. According to OECD figures of 2009, the Greeks are the only ones among western countries who exceed the line of two thousand working hours per year: Greece, 2119 per year; Australia 1690; Belgium 1550; Netherlands 1378. That the average Dutch people in the street, or average Dutch journalists are ignorant, fail to inform themselves, and utter the most insulting remarks, doesn’t surprise me given our social climate, but if politicians and notables express themselves in the same way, it’s time to ring the alarm bell.

Geert Wilders, the Dutch far-right populist, calls the Greeks ‘junkies’, to whom you shouldn’t give any money. Our national demagogue has found his new Moroccans in Europe — the Greek people and the inhabitants of other “garlic countries”. Piet Moerland, Rabobank CEO, believes that “the Greeks have to feel the threshold of pain”. What Greeks? Anyone but the honorable ladies and gentlemen with whom he knowingly did business? Or the ordinary Greek citizen, who had nothing to do with it, but who’s paying the bill? The Dutch, who are only sensitive towards their wallets and who have no regard for history, causality, or the social consequences of the often unjustified measures that have until now affected the weak in Greek society (simple workers and pensioners), are living up to their reputation.

In 1974, after seven years of dictatorship, Greece became free and independent for the first time, after decades of foreign interference and oppression by right-wing governments that didn’t care for the people. When, in 1981, Andreas Papandreou, the father of the incumbent prime minister, took power to become the first left-wing prime minister in the history of Hellas, he played into the pressing needs of the people at the time: the need for freedom (everything should be allowed, including demonstrations, powerful unions and ‘free state’ universities where the police wasn’t allowed to venture), the need for national pride, and the need for a caring state. He thought the economy would grow by pumping in money, increasing incomes and creating employment. So he began to borrow.

Papandreou was anything but successful, even though he had been a professor of economics at Berkeley. His strategy would have worked only in a protected economy, but Greece was a member of the EEC. The extra income of the people went straight to consumer goods that were imported from abroad. The money borrowed from abroad flowed right back into those very same countries. Industry in Greece slowly faded. Companies went bankrupt. Northern Europe was stronger and better.

The same happened with other countries in Europe’s southern axis. Weaker economies served as a growing market for the stronger economies in the European core. With the introduction of the euro in 2001, this development proceeded even further. Germany and the Netherlands benefited enormously, both through collecting interest on loans and through the growth of their exports.

All in all, Brussels and the European banks gave in to their own drive for profit maximization without any self-restraint, lending some 2,000 billion euros to Ireland, Belgium, Portugal and Spain — and to Greece, while everyone was fully aware that cronyism there still reigned supreme after entrance into the European Union, that the public sector was bursting at the seams, that the business climate was poor, that the political elite on the left and on the right was corrupt, that the rich engaged in mass tax evasion, that the institutions functioned poorly, and that European money was not being used well. If you do that for thirty years, without any checks or sanctions, can you still keep a straight face while blaming the Greeks alone for their mismanagement?

Did Brussels not know by 2009 that the Greek budget deficit was not 6, but 12 percent? Nonsense. Brussels and the banks were simply standing there, looking on and doing business with anyone who all those people who are now being called a “bottomless souvlaki”.

As long as the Greek economy kept growing at a remarkable 4-5 percent rate, thanks to the tourism and shipping industries (in which the Greek shipowners are considered the absolute world leaders), nothing could go wrong. The structural instability caused by excessive borrowing remained invisible until the crisis of 2008 did hit Europe, but left Greece untouched for the moment. The EU, under the presidency of France, decided to support the banks. Greece participated, although Greek banks did not use the support at the time. They did not need to, because — unlike Dutch banks — they had not participated in the “American casino games”. In that respect, the Greek banks were more solid enterprises than the Dutch ones. Their problem was — and still is — just that they (also) had Greek bonds in their portfolios. In 2009, the global shipping industry collapsed as a result of the global crisis. Tourism decreased dramatically. In the spring of 2009, European Commissioner Almunia warned repeatedly that things would go wrong for Greece. Nobody did anything. There were Greek elections in June and September. In such moments, it’s customary for Brussels not to bother a member state. Moreover, the right-wing prime minister at the time, Karamanlis, who was an ally of neoliberal Nothern Europe, felt that support measures could wait.

Only in the autumn of 2009, after the “confession” and “Mea Culpa” on the Greek deficit by prime minister Giorgos Papandreou in Brussels, right at the moment when the global crisis was starting to be felt in Greece, did the full extent of the country’s problems emerge. Ever since, the propaganda machine has been running at full speed. Contrary to reality, the Greeks are not just being blamed, but they are suddenly also considered to be Mediterranean profiteers, living like a louse on a sore head, at the expense of the righteous North European taxpayer. The angry statements by EU bosses like Barroso, Trichet, Juncker and Merkel were raining down. Papandreou did not even get time to sort things out. No, Greece should immediately display good behavior. Speculators smelled blood. They openly started betting on a Greek default.

Greece was drained by the markets. It no longer received any credit and had to beg the EU for assistance. Under the leadership of Angela Merkel, the IMF was called in. Tough conditions were set, even harsher than the IMF desired: punishment was enacted. Punishment for what? Punishing Greece is like a perverse confirmation of the EU’s inherent powerlessness, and a confirmation of the fact that the EU is mainly a bureaucratic institution that fails to act politically when it has to in order to stave off catastrophe.

The ordinary Greek people are now expected to foot the bill for the extremely high interest repayments to the European banks. Unfortunately, the Greek prime minister started last year what he should have ended with. Taxes have been raised. Salaries were already much lower than in the Netherlands, but they have now been reduced by an additional 15 percent. Social security has been minimized. All kinds of public services have been cut out entirely.

Most Greeks are struggling just to keep their head above the water. Every day, desperate people demonstrate in downtown Athens. They are not, in other words, on the beach drinking ouzo. But it’s not enough. The merciless figures show that the situation in Greece has actually gotten worse. The Greek market has collapsed. Tax increases are failing to raise revenues (you simply can’t squeeze any milk out of an empty cow). All the public sectors in Greece — postal services, ports, utilities, etc. — have to be privatized, not so much to help the Greeks, or to actually increase the efficiency of these often poorly-functioning institutions, but rather to for them to serve as collateral for the European banks. Sharply lower incomes and higher taxes, combined with top-heavy loans, do not only destroy the economy, but also social cohesion. Unemployment has already reached 16 percent. Next year, it will be 22 percent. Greek people have no prospects. Among those under 35 years of age, 37 percent wants to emigrate.

Dutch Finance Minister Jan-Kees de Jager sees only one solution: “A very radical, painful adjustment package for the economy, cuts and privatization, whether there is political opposition or not”. So what does he envision? Do those Greeks who have bought houses, but who can no longer pay for them because the housing market has completely collapsed, have to be evicted en masse? Do defaulters have to have their water and electricity cut off? Do all Greek buses have to go back to the depot, do schools and hospitals have to be closed? How far do De Jager and his neoliberal buddies want to go?

As far as I’m aware, there is not a single Greek who is not aware of the fact that the debt has to be repaid, but they justly demand lower interest rates and longer repayment terms. They also want the cacophony of ominous and hateful statements from European leaders to be stopped, so that Greece can get some air to recover.

The scourge of our time is that we are formulating ever more simplistic solutions, in childish neoliberal doublespeak, for the extremely intricate and complex problems we face. The reality of globalization and extreme interdependence of financial institutions is different and screams for greater insight, reflection and good governance. Nobody offers any perspective. ”Simple solutions” do not exist. Brussels doesn’t know anymore. Neither does Dutch politics.

Continue reading »

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Bancaire crises worden vrijwel altijd veroorzaakt door vastgoed. Dat was in Nederland in 1982 zo, in Japan in 1992, in Scandinavië in 1994, in Azië in 1997 en natuurlijk in de Verenigde Staten in 2007. Je zou er zo een gulden regel voor beleggers van kunnen maken: als in Meppel de huizenprijzen sneller stijgen dan de economie, hoed je dan. Zoals je dat ook moet doen als de CEO van pak ‘m beet Ahold met een nieuwe bimbo in het Stan Huygens-journaal staat. Of wanneer overheden een ‘starchitect’ met hoornen bril in de arm nemen om een Atrium, Campus of Museumkwartier uit de grond te stampen.

Euteur: Ewald Engelen. Hele column te lezen in de Groene Amsterdammer van deze week

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flow of bank deposits from EAP5 (aka Greece Portugal Italy Ireland Spain) to euro core

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5 delen:

In part 1 of this INET interview, Sylvia Nasar talks about her book, Grand Pursuit: The Story of Economic Genius. She suggests that Charles Dickens’ A Christmas Carol was an early work of economics. Dickens realized that the old view of stagnant, persistent poverty didn’t fit the dynamics of the real-world economy. In her view, A Christmas Carol was essentially an economic conversion story. Following through on Dickens’ vision, Alfred Marshall would later introduce the idea of productivity growth as a driver of economic progress

In part 2 of this INET interview, Sylvia Nasar discusses how Alfred Marshall formulated his idea of productivity growth as an engine for economic change. Following in his footsteps, Beatrice Webb noted that the conditions of poverty were preventing people from rising out of poverty. From her discovery came the idea of the welfare state

In part 3 of this INET interview, Sylvia Nasar discusses the work of Keynes and Irving Fisher and how they changed the field of economics in the early 20th century. Their ideas on monetary economics introduced the idea that the economy was not simply controlled by natural forces, but that there were mechanisms whereby it could be controlled. They suggested counter-cyclical fiscal policies that have been commonplace ever since

In part 4 of this INET interview, Sylvia Nasar discusses how Joseph Schumpeter and Friedrich von Hayek challenged the economics of Keynes in the early-to-mid 20th century. However, their work fell in the face of empirical evidence, while the work of Keynes and Fischer became more accepted. Hayek even sided with Keynes on the Bretton Woods Treaty and fighting unemployment, suggesting that maybe he needs to be protected from his disciples

In part 5 of this INET interview, Sylvia Nasar discusses the current state of economics. She suggests that despite its recent failures to predict and understand the financial crisis, the economics profession is still vibrant. While much of this exciting work may not yet be in the economic mainstream, neither were Fisher and Keynes for much of their own time

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Up to two VoxEU.org contributions per month may be reproduced in full by any one website or printed publication without prior consent subject to proper attributions, specifically “VoxEU.org” must be mentioned as the source and a link to VoxEU.org must be provided (for web pages). Further, columns may only be reproduced at least 24 hours after they first appeared on VoxEU.org.

What does it mean to be a ‘Keynesian’? This column argues that, like so much in economics, the label has become politicised. The cost is an impoverished policy debate that is resulting in millions of avoidable job cuts.

I joined the UK Treasury in 1987 and subsequently went to Princeton, where I studied with Rogoff and Campbell. Eventually, I ended up in the Cabinet Office, advising the Prime Minister, on the eve of the 2008 crisis. At no point during this period, however, did I think of myself as a ‘Keynesian’. Nor was it really a meaningful question. You might as well have asked a physicist if he was a ‘Newtonian’. Keynes was a great figure (indeed, one of the greatest Britons of the 20th century) and you had to understand his insights to understand macroeconomics; but the debate had moved on.The Treasury approach to macroeconomic management throughout this period was that while fiscal policy mattered, it wasn’t – for largely pragmatic reasons – sensible to adjust policy in order to manage demand; monetary policy was quicker, more transparent, and less subject to political distortion. The theoretical argument behind this was famously set out in Nigel Lawson’s 1984 Mais Lecture. And I fully subscribed to this view.Of course, post-2008, things are rather more complicated. So what could it mean to be a ‘Keynesian’? I can think of a number of possible definitions.

Definition 1

Going back to the 1930s, Keynes himself obviously defined himself in opposition to the ‘Treasury View’ (often equated, perhaps somewhat unfairly, to ‘Say’s Law’, that supply creates its own demand. See Quiggin 2011 for a historical discussion). The Treasury View argues that fiscal policy cannot, as an accounting identity, affect aggregate demand, because the government needs to get the extra money from somewhere, whether through taxes or borrowing. So a Keynesian is anyone who doesn’t believe this identity means that fiscal policy can’t affect demand. And this appears to be the definition espoused at one point by John Cochrane (2009) of Chicago University, who wrote:

First, if money is not going to be printed, it has to come from somewhere. If the government borrows a dollar from you, that is a dollar that you do not spend, or that you do not lend to a company to spend on new investment. Every dollar of increased government spending must correspond to one less dollar of private spending. Jobs created by stimulus spending are offset by jobs lost from the decline in private spending. We can build roads instead of factories, but fiscal stimulus can’t help us to build more of both. This form of ‘crowding out’ is just accounting, and doesn’t rest on any perceptions or behavioural assumptions.

As readers will know, this became the subject of a furious row in the econo-blogosphere, with Paul Krugman, Brad Delong, and Simon Wren-Lewis accusing Cochrane of “undergraduate errors” (Wren-Lewis 2012b). Cochrane himself seems to have retreated from this position, as Delong and others have pointed out (Cochrane 2012 and Delong 2012). But leaving US academic disputes aside, obviously in this sense I am a Keynesian – hence the title of my own blog! But then so is everybody else, including today’s Treasury. Nobody, and I mean nobody, really believes that it is impossible by definition for fiscal policy to affect aggregate demand.

Definition 2

A more plausible, and traditional, definition is to say that a Keynesian is someone who believes that as an empirical matter, fiscal policy does have a substantial impact on aggregate demand; in contrast to those who believe that ‘Ricardian equivalence’ means that changes to government spending and borrowing will be substantially or wholly offset by changes to private sector spending and saving. More recently, the doctrine of ‘expansionary fiscal contraction’ went even further, and argued that tightening fiscal policy could, through exchange rate and confidence effects, actually increase demand and growth; a paper by Alesina and Ardagna (2009) was particularly influential in this respect, and even (tentatively and briefly) influenced the UK Treasury here, who argued in the 2010 Emergency Budget that: “These [the wider effects of fiscal consolidation] will tend to boost demand growth, could improve the underlying performance of the economy and could even be sufficiently strong to outweigh the negative effects” (HM Treasury 2010).

The Treasury has not as far as I am aware repeated this argument, since the evidence shows precisely the opposite. The original paper has been widely questioned, debunked by further IMF research, and (more importantly) experience has hardly verified its claims. The conventional wisdom now is very much that of the IMF, which by October 2010 had already concluded that: “Fiscal consolidation typically lowers growth in the short term. Using a new data set, we find that after two years, a budget deficit cut of 1% of GDP tends to lower output by about 0.5% and raise the unemployment rate by one third of a percentage point.” This result was later formalised in Leigh et al 2010. The IMF has if anything strengthened its views since, with the current Chief Economist, Olivier Blanchard, saying recently: “[fiscal consolidation] is clearly a drag on demand, it is a drag on growth” (Blanchard 2012).

So I’m a Keynesian on this definition, but then so too are the Managing Director and Chief Economist of the IMF. And so indeed too are the Treasury, Bank of England, and the Office of Budget Responsibility; their models incorporate multipliers, and I do not think that senior officials at any of these institutions would deny for a minute that fiscal consolidation has, in practice, had a negative impact on growth in the UK. For example, the Monetary Policy Committee said in November 2011: “Growth had been weak throughout the past year, reflecting a fall in real household incomes, persistently tight credit conditions and the effects of the continuing fiscal consolidation.”

Definition 3

So under Definitions 1 and 2 I’m a Keynesian, but then so is pretty much everyone else whom one would take seriously. The final definition, then, of a Keynesian, appears to be a much more ‘political’ one – someone who thinks that slowing fiscal consolidation would be a sensible policy decision in the current UK (or US) economic context. But this definition seems to me to be misconceived, for two reasons. First, if ‘Keynesian’ means anything, it must surely have a more general significance than indicating one’s position on a particular policy choice in a particular country at a particular time. Surely it should indicate a philosophy, a theoretical view, or at least a view of what the empirical evidence means?

Perhaps more importantly, it is quite clear that – now that the ‘expansionary fiscal contraction’ hypothesis has been discredited – the main argument between those of us who favour slowing fiscal consolidation in the UK and those who think that this would be a dangerous mistake is not about whether the direct impact would be positive. It is whether the price of this direct positive impact would be ‘credibility’ with financial markets, and hence a damaging rise in long-term interest rates that would more than offset the gains.

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Should  such a tail risk of financial volatility emanating from Europe be realized, it would drag China’s growth lower.  The channels of contagion would be felt mainly through trade, with knock-on effects to domestic demand. In the downside scenario outlined in the WEO Update—which  would see global growth falling by 1¾ percentage points relative to the baseline—China’s  growth  would fall by around 4 percentage points (Box 1). The risks to China from Europe are, therefore, both large and tangible.

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Wordt het een dieprode maandag? Omstreeks de 13e februari verwacht het Griekse Ministerie uitsluitsel over een staatsschuld-deal. Maar ondertussen lijkt het bankroet van Griekenland onafwendbaar. Al tien jaar blijkt de Amerikaanse investeringsbank Goldman Sachs de Griekse overheid te hebben voorzien van riskante financiële constructies die de schuld van het land lager lieten uitvallen dan ze in werkelijkheid was. Daarmee hielp Goldman Sachs Griekenland om boven zijn stand te leven en zich steeds dieper in de schuld te steken. Het leverde Goldman Sachs honderden miljoenen op en was het begin van de structurele ondermijning van de euro.

De schulden van Griekenland zijn enorm en inmiddels staat Griekenland dan ook onder curatele van een trojka bestaande uit de Europese Unie, het IMF en de Europese Centrale Bank. De bezuinigingen treffen een bevolking die nauwelijks begrijpt hoe het zo ver heeft kunnen komen. Wat gebeurde er precies in juni en december 2001? Goldman Sachs hielp het Griekse ministerie van financiën aan trucs om de schuld meer in de richting van 60% van het b.b.p. te brengen (het criterium voor deelname aan de euro). Zowel de bank als de Griekse overheid vonden het de normaalste zaak van de wereld. ‘Iedereen deed het’, zo heette het. Ook de Europese controleur, Eurostat, was op de hoogte van de deals en zag er geen kwaad in. Maar het verergerde de zaak voor Athene en zorgde voor de eerste barst in de idealen van de eurozone. Regisseur Alexander Oey ging voor Tegenlicht in New York, Londen en Athene op zoek naar antwoorden op de vraag hoe dit heeft kunnen gebeuren en filmde in het Griekenland van nu de verwoestende gevolgen.

In deze aflevering de visies van:
- William D. Cohan, schrijver van ‘Money and Power. How Goldman Sachs came to rule the world’. Cohan is een voormalig bankier die zich inmiddels tot onderzoeksjournalist en publicist heeft ontwikkeld. Zijn boek beschrijft de geschiedenis van Goldman Sachs van binnenuit.
- Nomi Prins, voormalig partner en managing director bij Goldman Sachs. Verliet Goldman Sachs in 2002 omdat ze het niet eens was met de koers die de zakenbank insloeg na de beursgang in 1999.Sindsdien actief bij de progressieve denktank Demos.
- Nick Dunbar is als financieel journalist werkzaam bij Bloomberg. Schreef in 2003 het eerste geruchtmakende artikel over de schuldswap van 2001. Auteur van het boek ‘The Devil’s Derivatives’
- Yanis Varoufakis, Grieks econoom. Protesteerde in 2005 bij Eurostat tegen de deal.
- Christoforos Sardelis, voormalig hoofd van het agentschap van de Griekse staatschuld. Houdt bij hoog en bij laag vol dat de deals geen nadelige invloed hadden op de schuldontwikkeling.
- Petros Christodoulou, de opvolger van Sardelis als hoofd van de Greek debt management agency. Begon als trader bij Goldman Sachs en was verbonden aan de Griekse Centrale Bank.

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Het lijkt erop dat wereldwijd een poging gedaan wordt om de welvaartsstaat tot zondebok van de crisis te maken. De crisis komt door de welvaartsstaat en dus moet die eraan geloven.Waarom gaat de discussie niet over de vernietigende werking van de Duitse exportoverschotten of de andere structurele problemen in de Eurozone

Bron: Inter Partes (Creative Commons)

In November, the Australian published an opinion from the Centre for Independent Studies blaming the Eurozone debt crisis on social democrats, who “glossed over [the] inherent contradictions [in social democracy] by running massive deficits.” The Canberra Times also ran an article from the Institute of Public Affairs asserting that the crisis could be blamed on the “welfare state,” which “numerous studies show … impede[s] private sector production and growth by distorting incentives to work and save.” In an article curiously entitled “Eurozone v Australia: why we beat them,” Bob Carr suggests that our means-tested welfare system means Australia is unlikely to suffer a similar fate.

The Opposition warns us that the Government’s “reckless” spending places Australia at risk of a similar crisis. Kelly O’Dwyer thinks Australia’s public debt “rank[s] worse than Spain, Greece and Portugal” — “If this government were a pack of cards, then Wayne Swan would be the joker of deficits. Unlike Peter Costello, who is the king of surpluses, he would be the joker of deficits.” Barnaby Joyce claims that Australia has had the “third-biggest cumulative increase in real public debt since 2007,” apparently referring to this chart from an article in Policy Analyses in International Economics:

Indeed, Australia has the third-longest bar in this chart — because it measures public debt in 2010 as a proportion of public debt in 2007. Hence the “biggest” increases are those in countries which had relatively low public debt prior to the financial crisis, and the “smallest” increase was in Japan, the world’s most indebted sovereign. The trillions of dollars worth of debt issued by Japan since the crisis (around 40% of its GDP) appear relatively insignificant because Japan carried so much debt in 2007.

Australia’s increase in debt is far more modest when measured in gross terms or as a percentage of GDP. Clearly we’re not in the same economic position as the Europeans. But why? Carr cited Sweden as one of several countries with a government sector so bloated it consumes more than 50% of GDP, but the Scandinavian countries are in good financial health compared to the Eurozone.

Continue reading »

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The Great Anti-Keynesian Flip-Out

Keynesian economists made some pretty clear predictions around 3 years ago – predictions that were very much at odds with what anti-Keynesians were saying

Lees verder op het blog van Paul Krugman

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The ABS house price data for December 2011 has just been released, and it shows that house prices fell 4.8% in nominal terms between December 2010 and December 2011. The usual suspects are already trying to see this as marking the bottom, while “just the facts, ma’am” reporting simply emphasises the scale of the downturn. A couple of media outlets have asked my views on the next calendar year, so here they are–along with some historical perspective on the house price bubble.

Figure 1 deflates the ABS series by the CPI, and sets the real price index at 100 in mid-1986, when the ABS Data began. The peak was 261 (which means that real house prices were 2.6 times as high in 2010 as they were in 1986), the December 2011 value was 237, a fall of 9.3%. That’s in the ballpark of the figure I anticipated at the beginning of 2011 for the fall from the peak; over the calendar year of 2011, real house prices fell 7.7% (from 256 to 237), which is still in the range of 10 percent (see Figure 1; the vertical blue lines on this chart mark the beginning of 4 of the 5 incarnations of the First Home Owners Scheme [ its introduction was under Hawke in 1983; its last spin was the doubling and trebling of it by Rudd in 2008-10]).

Figure 1

Lees verder op het blog van Steve Keen (DEBTWATCH)

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